Bomb, bomb Iran

On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel started a massive aerial campaign against Iran, named Operation Epic Fury by the Americans and Operation Roaring Lion by the Israelis. The first wave of attacks killed Ayatollah Khameini and dozens of associates, including the armed forces chief-of-staff, IRGC commander, deputy head of intelligence, and more. So many were eliminated that President Trump joked that his “preferred” successors to Khameini are no longer available.

That Iran had no answer to large-scale airpower was already amply demonstrated in last year’s 12-day War, when Israel took control of Tehran airspace within 48 hours. Even if the regime’s military hardware was capable–which it’s not, being a mix of Russian-export S-300s, ancient American Hawks, and various domestic knock-offs–its crews are poorly trained, as exemplified by the shootdown of an Air Canada plane over Tehran in the aftermath of Soleimani’s assassination.

However, the regime is not without teeth. Although its defenses are no match for a modern air force, it can go on the offensive with a large number of missiles and drones. Since the start of the conflict, Iran has attacked Israel and nearly all neighboring countries. It has also threatened shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, though at least one victim appears to have been a “shadow fleet” tanker w/ several Iranian crew members.

The question, then, is how this latest round of fighting will end. While Israeli prime minister Netanyahu is insistent on regime change, President Trump is more circumspect, suggesting that a Venezuela-like shift in political posture would be an acceptable outcome¹. No ground forces have been prepared, so both are hoping that a new round of Iranian domestic unrest will severe weaken, if not overthrow, the government. But while there has certainly been glee at Khameini’s death within Iran, it’s far from certain that airstrikes plus protests will dislodge the mullahs. What then are the likely ways this conflict will end, and what does it bode for the region’s future?

Brother, can you spare some regime change?

Regime change in Iran is the dream of various parties, such PM Netanyahu, Senator Lindsey Graham, and much of the Iranian diaspora. The exiled royal family also has an obvious vested interest in the regime’s fall, believing it can pick up where it left off in 1979. And the Gulf Arabs, particular Saudi Arabia, would love to see an Iranian collapse, not because they’re interested in a friendlier Iranian government, but so that they can dispatch a regional rival.

However, the Islamic Republic has not survived the past half-century for nothing; nearly all its institutions are constructed to ensure regime survival. Splitting the armed forces between the regular army and IRGC helps prevent coups à la 1953. Political authority is vested in the entire class of high-level religious clerics, not just a single family², ensuring there are plenty of potential successors. Complex ties between the clerical, military, and business sectors have been established, entangling interests and preventing easy ship-jumping. The regime also maintains significant support among rural conservatives, whose survival depends on government subsidies and are certainly not going to side with urban university students against the ayatollahs.

Israel may yet pull off more intelligence coups and wipe out more senior members of the government, but this alone will not collapse the regime. The same was done to Hamas and Hezbollah, both of which continue to limp along. The Islamic Republic has been around long enough that it’s effectively eliminated organized domestic opposition³, and foreign opponents like the Pahlavis have been away from the political scene too long to have any credibility.

In the event that there is regime change, therefore, it will have to come from within, perhaps with the army and IRGC turning their guns on each other, as in Sudan between the army and RSF militia. For this to happen, however, the entirety clerical class must lose political credibility, which is highly unlikely. Unlike Sudan, where former leader Omar al-Bashir ran the country as a personal fiefdom, Iran’s political structure does not revolve around one person⁴. While factions exist, the ayatollahs understand that, when push comes to shove, they must hang together lest they hang separately.

Ayatollah in an arepa

The “Venezuelan option”, where the regime stays intact but does a 180 on its policies, is also not very likely. What the US would like to see from Iran is:

1. No nuclear weapons
2. No using missiles, drones, and terrorist groups to harm American and allied interests
3. No military / geopolitical cooperation with Russia and China
4. Open the oil and gas industry to American companies

But unlike Venezuela, which has no capacity to be a regional power, Iran has dreams of dominating the Middle East. These ambitions are inherited from the Persian empires of old, and were very much shared by the Shah, under whom relations with Saudi Arabia were just as poor as today. Conceding on any of these issues would be ideological surrender; conceding on all of them would be political suicide. At best, Iran can reduce enrichment, promise not to use its missiles and drones, rein in groups like Hezbollah, and open the energy sector to partnerships with state-owned firms. None of these will be satisfactory to the Americans, who have no trust in the relationship after decades of bad blood.

Modern Iran is a twisted combination of Shiite extremism and vestigial Persian imperialism wrapped in a Cold War Marxist political structure. There is no Deng Xiaoping-like figure to take the country on the path of reform⁵, and certainly no Darcy Rodriguez waiting to accept power and improve external relations. The aforementioned web of regime-preserving interests ensures that political change is vigorously resisted, and on certain issues–uranium enrichment, state control of oil, and opposition to Israel, just to name a few–public support is in favor of maintaining current policies, albeit perhaps to varying degrees. The threat of massive destruction may force the regime to make limited, tactical concessions, but Tehran’s overarching goal will still be to bide its time and secretly build up its weapons and proxies until it has an opportunity to use them to force the United States out of the region.

Cutting the tall grass

Another scenario is to do what Israel has done against all of its regional enemies–bomb them until they no longer pose a threat, watch while they secretly rebuild, then bomb them again. Such a strategy has been employed against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Assadist Syria, and proved sufficient to maintain Israeli supremacy in the region.

However, it is not without cost. Israel is constantly monitoring its enemies, ready to strike at a moment’s notice. Fighting, while heavily favoring Israel, imposes damage and casualties. Strategic slip-ups, like believing Hamas was well and truly beaten after Operation Guardian of the Walls, lead to disasters like October 7⁶.

Iran is much larger than the likes of Hamas and Hezbollah, which poses advantages and disadvantages for the US. On the one hand, the Iranian government, unlike its proxy militant groups, must actually govern, so it can be hurt by non-kinetic means, such as sanctions. On the other hand, it wields significantly more resources, and can rebuild weapon stockpiles much faster. An occasional punch in the face, such as Operation Praying Mantis, can be effective in shaping the regime’s behavior, but this alone is not strategy. The United States has global interests, and when it shifts attention from the Middle East to the Atlantic or Pacific, Iran will take advantage of greater freedom of action to cause trouble.

A stool with four legs

The only valid long-term strategy is to establish a balance of power in the region that automatically constraints Iranian behavior without heavy-handed American involvement.

The trouble the US has had with Iran this century has been a direct result of removing Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as a check on Iran, thereby allowing the mullahs to expand their malign influence via the “Shiite Crescent”. The Bush administration knew very well that Iran was behind the Shiite militants attacking American forces in Iraq, but needed cooperation from the broader Shiites, who are the majority in the country, and so was constrained in its ability to confront Tehran. Furthermore, given the weakness of the Iraqi military⁷, Shiite militant groups were grudgingly viewed as a necessary evil to counter Sunni terrorists. Bush was never able to get a grip on the Iraq situation–it’s not clear that he ever understood what he’d broken–and so the problem was passed to Obama.

The Obama administration believed that the Iraq War was an unpopular debacle–which it was–and that Afghanistan was the “good war”. It therefore sought to reduce forces in the former and surge them into the latter. It did recognize, however, that Iran could not be allowed to run amok, so it came up with the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal.

The deal was never solely about the nuclear issue, but an ill-conceived attempt to bring the Russians, Chinese, and Europeans to the table so all major powers have a vested interest in reining in Tehran. It should have been obvious, however, that the Europeans had no capacity to police Iran’s actions, while the Russians and Chinese had incentive to use Tehran to cause trouble for the United States. The Gulf Arabs saw this as a massive betrayal on top of strategic blunders such as backing Muslim Brotherhood factions during the 2011 Arab Spring, and became completely embittered with Obama.

The Trump administration’s strategy is to bring Israel and the Gulf Arabs together into an alliance to counter Iran via the Abraham Accords. The UAE and Bahrain quickly signed up, and the Saudis were waffling but moving towards signing, despite the Palestinian issue keeping the Gulf monarchies wary of any formal cooperation with Jerusalem⁸. It is strongly suspected that Hamas’ October 7 attack was encouraged by Iran as a means to disrupt this process. Subsequently, Hamas and Hezbollah were crushed, while Assad was overthrown in Syria. Trump came up with a Board of Peace to deal with the Palestinian issue; not coincidentally, the most notable countries to signed on are the Gulf Arabs.

Israel started bombing the Houthis in May 2025, demonstrating its strategic reach. In June, it began the 12-day air campaign against Iran. This seems at least partly designed to convince the Gulf Arabs that an alliance with Israel, now the overwhelming military power in the region, was worth the political risk.

This leads to what’s happening now: the US and Israel ruthlessly eliminating Iranian leadership and destroying its military capabilities. Whether the Iranian regime falls or not, it sends a message to the Gulf Arabs that the only real counter to Tehran are Washington and Jerusalem, and the road to the former runs through the latter. Iran has only helped this process along by lashing out at neighboring states.

The long-term goal is to divide the Middle East into four power bases–Israel, the Gulf Arabs, Iran, and Turkey. The US has close relations with the first two, so it naturally wants to bring them together. Iran is an enemy, but one that can be made to think twice before acting disruptively if the other actors are against it. Turkey is a wildcard, a NATO member that, like Iran, has a strong sense of imperial irredentism. Its ability to cultivate proxies, however, is limited, and it must also pay attention to the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and even Central Asia.

The current campaign against Tehran must be viewed in this light–not as a final battle for regime change, but a process of constraining future Iranian behavior. The real measure of success will not be how many mullahs are vaporized, but how effectively the Gulf Arabs can cooperate with Israel afterwards. More ayatollahs can be promoted, and more missiles built, but if everywhere Iran looks, it sees a unified opposing front while its own allies lie broken and bleeding, it won’t be starting any fires.